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1 INTRODUCTION
Developing a new economic theory of market quality, Yano (2008, 2009)
emphasizes that high market quality is an essential precondition for achieving
healthy economic growth and that the lack of high quality markets causes
fundamental malfunctions in the market allocation mechanism. According to
Yano (2008, 2009), the basic determinants of market quality are the quality
of competition, quality of information, and product quality. To assure high
quality of competition and information, we require the establishment of solid
market infrastructure, such as fair laws and rules, healthy institutions and
organizations, and good culture and customs.
Thus far, several researchers have addressed these basic determinants of
market quality. Focusing on the labor market, Dei (2011) models a devel-
oping economy in which the quality of the labor market is endogenously
determined through voting, and shows that if the voting takes place at the
wrong time, the country suers from a low quality labor market. Ma and
Dei (2009) examine the issue of product quality in a model of Chinese trade.
Furukawa (2010) applies the market quality theory to the intellectual prop-
erty rights market in a dynamic setting. These studies, which belong to the
market quality literature, do not deal with the quality of nancial markets.
In contrast, Savtchenko (2010) investigates the quality of information in the
international nancial market. Savtchenko states, \markets characterized by
currency crises cannot be called high quality markets," and shows that, when
economic agents possess only private information, a currency crisis in a coun-
try can be triggered by a similar event in another country. Our paper also
deals with the quality of nancial markets, but unlike Savtchenko (2010), we
consider a closed economy that faces credit constraints, and explicitly inves-
tigate how the degree of credit constraints aects economic uctuations. It
should be noted here that low quality nancial markets are typically char-
acterized by the presence of credit constraints. This may reect the poor
quality of information about borrowers and/or the lack of well-developed
enforcement rules or institutions in such markets.
There are two major reasons why we focus on nancial markets. First, a
large number of economists, in the tradition of Keynes (1936), have viewed
the nancial sector as the source of business uctuations. Second, there
is much empirical support for this view. For example, several well-known
historical episodes, such as the Great Depression before World War II, the
lost decade in Japan after the boom of the 1980s, and the sub-prime loan
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problems in the late 2000s, are consistent with this view. More recently,
several researchers such as Easterly et al. (2000), Denizer et al. (2002), and
Beck et al. (2006) have presented empirical evidence indicating that nancial
development has a negative eect on the volatility of an economy.
In our model, agents within the same generation are heterogeneous with
respect to their productivity in creating capital goods. Each agent has two
saving methods. The rst involves depositing a part of one's wage income
in a nancial intermediary, and the second is to start an investment project.
In equilibrium, less talented agents deposit part of their wage income in
the nancial intermediary, and do not start investment projects. They are
analogous to the agents in Samuelson's consumption loan model. On the
other hand, agents that are more talented start investment projects. These
parallel the agents in Diamond's production economy. Our main result is
as follows. If credit constraints are either severe or too soft, an economy
converges to an asymptotically stable steady state, but if credit constraints
are moderate, deterministic cycles or chaos can arise.
We use the degree of credit constraints to denote the degree of nancial
development: as the nancial sector develops, credit constraints are relaxed.
Moreover we employ Cobb-Douglas utility and production functions. With
Cobb-Douglas utility and production functions, a perfect nancial market
does not generate endogenous business cycles; however, an imperfect nancial
market might do so. This fact indicates that the chaotic dynamics in our
model arise due to the moderate degree of nancial development.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we
discuss the literature related to our study. The model is presented in section
3. In section 4, we derive a competitive equilibrium, and in section 5, we
investigate the dynamic properties of the economy. In section 6, we provide
a discussion about the degree of credit constraints under which endogenous
business cycles are most likely to occur. In section 7, we execute a numerical
analysis, and we provide concluding remarks in section 8.
2 RELATED LITERATURE
Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) develop dy-
namic general equilibrium models with credit constraints, and show that
a negative productivity shock can have a prolonged negative eect on the
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macroeconomy;1 however, they do not clarify what degree of credit con-
straints is most likely to give rise to high volatility. Furthermore, their mod-
els do not derive endogenous business cycles. In contrast, the business cycles
in our model are endogenous, and we investigate under what degree of credit
constraints these endogenous cycles are more likely to occur. In a small open
economy under the intermediate degree of credit constraints, Aghion et al.
(2004) and Caballe et al. (2006) derive deterministic endogenous cycles and
Pintus (2011) obtains endogenous cycles caused by self-fullling expectations.
Aghion et al. (1999) derive endogenous cycles in a closed economy under the
intermediate degree of credit constraints. As in Aghion et al. (1999), we ob-
tain endogenous business cycles for a closed economy under an intermediate
degree of credit constraints. Unlike Aghion et al. (1999), however, the cur-
rent study develops an overlapping generations model with hybrid aspects of
Samuelson (1958) and Diamond (1965). Because of the hybrid aspects, we
can construct a tractable model into which credit market imperfections are
easily incorporated.
This paper contributes to an extensive literature on endogenous busi-
ness uctuations in overlapping generations economies.2 Benhabib and Day
(1982) and Grandmont (1985) gave rise to a literature investigating the dy-
namic properties of exchange economies. This literature examines deter-
ministic cycles and chaotic behavior in equilibrium.3 On the other hand,
another strand of the literature studies the dynamic properties of overlap-
ping generations economies with production in the tradition of Diamond
(1965). For instance, Farmer (1986), Reichlin (1986), Benhabib and Laroque
(1988), and Rochon and Polemarchakis (2006) derive competitive equilib-
rium cycles in a production economy. Galor (1992) demonstrates the dy-
namic properties of an overlapping generations economy with two produc-
1Kiyotaki (1998) explains the basic mechanism of this result in a clear way. Many
researchers have extended these models in several directions. For example Aoki et al.
(2009), Kunieda and Shibata (2005), and Paashce (2001) have extended the Kiyotaki and
Moore type model to open economies. See Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) and Kiyotaki
(2011) for surveys on recent developments.
2Another inuential approach to endogenous business cycles was pioneered by Benhabib
and Nishimura (1985). Studies in this line employ innitely lived representative agent
models to show the possibility of endogenous business cycles. For example, Nishimura
and Yano (1995) develop a simple two-sector model with Leontief-type technologies, and
show that endogenous business cycles and chaotic dynamics can be generated in the model.
3Azariadis and Guesnerie (1986) and Guesnerie (1986) study sunspot equilibria of ex-
change economies by using overlapping generations models.
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tion sectors. None of these articles explicitly considers credit constraints.
In contrast, Gokan (2011), Kikuchi (2008), Kikuchi and Stachurski (2009),
Kikuchi and Vachadze (2013), and Matsuyama (2007, 2013) study credit-
constrained economies.4 These studies do not investigate how changes in
the degree of credit constraints aect economic uctuations. In particular,
Gokan (2011) develops an overlapping generations model with money and
shows that a monetary equilibrium path can exhibit cyclical movements.
However, the analysis of the relationship between the degree of credit con-
straints and macroeconomic instability is absent in his paper, unlike in ours.
3 MODEL
3.1 Individuals
The economy consists of overlapping generations: young and old. Time is
discrete and expands from 0 to1. Each individual lives for two periods and
the population of young agents at time t is given by Lt, which grows at rate
n >  1: Lt+1 = (1 + n)Lt. Following Bernanke and Gertler (1989), we may
think of a \period" as the length of a typical nancial contract.5
4 Early inuential studies on economic uctuations, such as Azariadis and Smith (1998)
and Suarez and Sussman (1997), carefully consider the microfoundations of credit market
imperfections, explicitly taking asymmetric information into account. Many subsequent
studies cited here focus more on the eects of credit constraints, taking the microfoun-
dations of credit market imperfections as given. Most recently, Favara (2012) explicitly
considers an agency problem between nanciers and entrepreneurs, and relates the agency
problem with investment instability.
5In this setting, each agent makes only one-time investment decision. Although this
may seem to be restrictive, it is not dicult to incorporate multiple-time investment
opportunities for each agent into our model. For example, we can extend the current
model to a Ramsey type growth model of innitely lived agents with idiosyncratic shocks
to agents' productivity in a similar way to Angeletos (2007). Even in this setting, we
can derive essentially the same dynamic properties as those of the current model. This
extension, however, complicates aggregation of individually specic variables, and thus
we must impose an additional assumption about the distribution of productivity shocks,
that is, we must assume that the idiosyncratic productivity shocks are independently and
identically distributed across both time and agents (the i.i.d. assumption). The virtue of
employing the two-period overlapping generations model is that we do not have to impose
the i.i.d. assumption because only one generation makes investment decisions in each
period.
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Each individual maximizes his lifetime utility:
ut(c1t(); c2t+1()) := c1t()
c2t+1()
1 ; 0 <  < 1 (1)
which is a Cobb-Douglas function of consumption (c1t(); c2t+1()) in youth
and old age. The index  expresses the heterogeneity of individuals. As will
be explained later,  also represents productivity of an individual.
Each individual is endowed with one unit of labor at his birth. When an
individual is young, he supplies one unit of labor to a production sector in
order to earn wage income wt, which is spent for consumption, investments
and/or deposits. Since the quality of young labor is even, wt does not vary
between agents. The budget constraint in the rst period is as follows:
c1t() + kt() + bt()  wt; (2)
where kt() is investment in a project and bt() is deposits when positive
or debts when negative. He has two kinds of transfer methods regarding his
wealth from the rst to the second period. One is to make a deposit in the
nancial intermediary. The other is to start an investment project.
An individual can borrow against future income by selling bonds to the
nancial intermediary. However, he faces a credit constraint characterized
by the following inequality:
bt()   kt(); 0   < 1: (3)
The source of the credit constraints is the possibility that borrowers may not
repay the nancial intermediary (see Aghion and Banerjee, 2005, Chapter
0). Parameter  is the measure of nancial development. If  is close to one,
the credit market is perfect, whereas if  is equal to zero, there is no credit
market in this economy.6
The budget constraint the individual faces in the second period is given
by:
c2t+1()  qt+1zt+1() + rt+1bt(); (4)
where zt+1() is the capital goods. Producing the capital goods zt+1()
takes one gestation period and they are created from the investments kt()
6Eq. (3) is equivalent to bt()   at()=(1   ) where at() := kt() + bt(). This
type of credit constraint is often employed in the literature. See Aghion et al. (1999),
Aghion and Banerjee (2005), Aghion et al. (2005), or Antras and Caballero (2009). In a
similar way to Aghion, et al. (1999), we can give a microfoundation for Eq.(3). A note on
the derivation of Eq.(3) is available upon request.
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in the rst period. qt+1 is the (real) price of the capital goods in terms of
consumption goods at time t + 1 and rt+1 is the gross interest rate. Income
in the second period is spent only for consumption. The production function
of zt+1() is given by:
zt+1() = kt(); (5)
where  is the productivity parameter of an individual.  varies between





Each individual maximizes his lifetime utility function subject to Eqs.(2)-
(5) and
kt()  0: (6)
Eq.(6) is a non-negativity constraint for the investments.
From the utility maximization problem, we obtain a lemma as follows:
Lemma 1
 If rt+1 > qt+1, then kt() = 0 and bt() = (1  )wt.
 If rt+1 < qt+1, then kt() = (1 )wt1  and bt() =  (1 )1  wt.
Proof : Let at() := kt() + bt(). From the utility maximization problem,
we have at() = (1 )wt for any agent. To maximize an income in old age, an
agent with rt+1 > qt+1 chooses kt() = 0 and bt() = (1 )wt and an agent
with rt+1 < qt+1 chooses bt() =  kt(), that is, kt() = (1 )wt=(1 )
and bt() =  (1  )wt=(1  ). 
Let us dene t := rt+1=qt+1. Then, t is a cuto that divides agents into
savers and borrowers (investors). From lemma 1 we note that if the produc-
tivity of an agent  is greater than t, he invests a proportion of his income
in a project. If the productivity is less than t, he does not invest in any
project but make a deposit in the nancial intermediary.
3.2 Production Sector
In a production sector, a representative rm produces consumption goods
from capital goods and labor. A Cobb-Douglas production function is as-
7The productivity of each agent is private information. Each agent learns his produc-
tivity at his birth; however, other people do not know his productivity. Accordingly, no
one can directly ask another individual whose productivity is greater than his to make








where Yt is the total output and Lt is the aggregate young labor. Zt is




goods depreciate entirely in one period. The production sector is perfectly
competitive so that the production factors, capital goods and labor, are paid




wt = (1  )zt ; (9)





There is an intergenerational banking system and agents make nancial
trades with each other through the nancial intermediary. This kind of
assumption is made by many researchers.8 Since the banking sector is com-
petitive, no prots are obtained by the nancial intermediary. The nancial
intermediary accommodates its supply of real liabilities to young agents so
that the nancial market always clears. Let Bt be net total assets held by
young agents in a generation t, i.e., Bt =
R a
0
bt()LtdG(). Or equivalently Bt
is regarded as the debt of the nancial intermediary. The budget constraint
of the nancial intermediary is given by
Bt+1 = rt+1Bt: (10)
The nancial intermediary limits its credit provision or liabilities to the pri-
vate sector following Eq.(10). If (10) holds, the goods market clears as well.
Note that Bt can be negative or positive. When Bt < 0 in a period, the -
nancial intermediary has the ownership of the economy's net assets; however,
these assets will become nancial resources lent to young agents in the next
period. When Bt > 0, the nancial intermediary is indebted to the private
agents. The nancial intermediary redeems this indebtedness by using a net
deposit in the next period. B0 is a predetermined variable since we do not
assume the existence of nominal money in this economy. At time zero, the
nancial intermediary can be a net creditor or a net debtor to the private
sector.
8See for example Grandmont (1983), Farmer (1986), Benhabib and Laroque (1988),




In competitive equilibrium, we obtain the aggregate supply of capital goods
and the total net assets held by young agents. From lemma 1 and Eq.(9),





1   LtdG() () zt+1 =
(1  )(1  )F (t)




where F (t) :=
R a
t










(1  )(1  )zt Lt
1   [G(t)  ]: (12)
From lemma 1, rt+1 = qt+1t = z
 1







The dynamical system in competitive equilibrium consists of Eqs.(11) and
(13). Fortunately, Eq.(13) is a one-dimensional dierence equation with re-








which is the right-hand side of Eq.(13). Note that the dierence equation
Eq.(13) is independent of population growth.
4.2 Steady States
There exist two steady-state equilibria  and  in Eq. (13) such that:







(1  ) ; (15)
respectively.
The net total assets held by young agents is always zero in the steady-
state equilibrium with . We call this steady state a non-trade steady state.
Meanwhile, in the steady-state equilibrium with , the net total assets
in a generation is positive or negative, i.e., the steady-state equilibrium is
supported by credit or debt of the nancial intermediary. We call this steady
state a trade steady sate. In the non-trade steady state, the borrowing
and the lending within a generation are canceled out, whereas in the trade
steady state, the credit market clears over two generations. Either in the
trade steady state or in the non-trade steady state, there are both borrowers
and lenders within a generation generically.9
Gale (1973) and Grandmont (1983) categorized an economy into two
classes. An economy in which the trade steady state is supported by debt
of the nancial intermediary is called the Samuelsonian case, whereas an
economy in which the trade steady state is supported by credit is called the
classical case. From Eq.(12), it follows that the economy is Samuelsonian
(classical) if and only if  < (>). If  = 0, then we obtain  = 0 and
 > 0. Then, by continuity, there exist s 2 <++ such that for  2 [0; s),
the economy is Samuelsonian. If the credit constraints are severe or if each
individual puts the weight of his utility on the second-period consumption,
it is likely that the economy is the Samuelsonian case. This is consistent
with our intuition, because every individual does not borrow so much in the
Samuelsonian case.
As we said, a trade steady state is supported by credit or debt of the -
nancial intermediary. In usual overlapping generations models, such a steady
state coincides with the golden rule. However, our trade steady state never
coincides with the golden rule. This is due to credit constraints. Since the
investors face credit constraints, economic resources cannot be used in an
ecient way. It is a necessary condition for the economy to attain the golden
rule that all resources are used by the most talented agents. Although a
trade steady state never becomes the golden rule, we can easily verify that
9One might argue that we should call the steady state with  the golden rule steady
state; however, this argument is misleading because, as discussed in what follows, the
steady state with  never maximizes per capita consumption in the economy due to
credit constraints.
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less talented agents obtain the biological interest rate r = 1+n in the steady
state. This means that all agents obtain at minimum the biological interest
rate in their second period while the economy cannot attain the golden rule.
In the Diamond-type overlapping generations models without the het-
erogeneity of agents within a generation, if the golden rule is supported by
national debt, then the golden-rule steady state and the Diamond steady
state (which correspond to our trade and non-trade steady states, respec-
tively) are Parato-ranked. However, our trade and non-trade steady states
can never be Parato-ranked. This is because of the heterogeneity of agents
and because of credit constraints.
5 DYNAMIC PROPERTIES
We dene a compact interval in < as X = [0;maxf; g]. If ftg1t=0 starts
with 0 2 (maxf; g; a], then G(t) becomes greater than one in nite
time. Therefore, such a sequence does not become equilibrium. We restrict
the domain of the dynamical system of Eq.(13) to X.
We assume that the minimum of 	() is no less than zero unless we
explicitly state otherwise. As will be discussed in section 6, if the minimum
of 	() is less than zero, for almost all the initial value of 0 no equilibrium
exists since for almost all the initial value of 0, the sequence ftg1t=0 exits
from the domain of the dynamical system in nite time. Only when 0 is
consistent with the existence of equilibrium by accident, the sequence ftg1t=0
could be equilibrium (see section 6).
If the domain of the dynamical system is restricted to X, then the map,
	 : X ! X, is continuous, mapping X into itself. Henceforth, we use the
pair (X;	) to denote our dynamical system. In what follows, we investigate
the local and global dynamic properties of the economy. We linearize the
dierence equation Eq.(13) around a steady state as follows:
t+1    = ()(t   );








(G()  ) + 1
i
.
While the initial value 0 reects the individuals' expectations for the
price of capital goods (q1) and the interest rate (r1), it is predetermined
since B0 is historically given (see Eq.(12)). This implies that the individuals
cannot have anticipations for q1 and r1 independently at time zero: the
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anticipations for q1 and r1 are restricted by the amount of B0. Henceforth,
we assume that B0 is small so that an equilibrium can exist.
Proposition 1
 If the economy is Samuelsonian, then the non-trade steady state is
locally stable, whereas the trade steady state is locally unstable.
 If the economy is classical, then the non-trade steady state is locally
unstable, whereas the stability of the trade steady state is ambiguous.
Proof : If the economy is Samuelson, then  < . Therefore, j()j =
j (1 )
(1 )(1 )F () j < j (1 )

(1 )(1 )F () j = 1 and j()j =
 1g() + F ()
(G()  ) + 1
 > 1. If the economy is classical, then  > . Therefore,
j()j = j (1 )
(1 )(1 )F () j > j (1 )

(1 )(1 )F () j = 1. However, we cannot know
about whether j()j =
 1g() + F ()(G()   ) + 1 is greater
than one or not. 
The phase diagrams of each case are given by gure 1. As seen in panel III,
if the trade steady state is locally unstable, it is possible that the dynamical
system will exhibit either cycles or chaos. At minimum, when the trade
steady state is locally unstable, there exists a period-two cycle.
[Figure 1 around here]
Proposition 2
Suppose that  < . If the trade steady state is locally unstable, there
exists a period-two cycle of ftg1t=0 in equilibrium.
Proof : Let ~	() = G 1(	()). Then Eq.(13) is written as t+1 = ~	(t).
Since () > 1, We can take 0 close to  so that ~	2(0) < 0 < . If
the steady-state equilibrium with  =  is locally unstable, then () <
 1. So we can take 00 close to  so that  < 00 < ~	2(00) < ~	2(0).
Therefore, by continuity, there exists 0 such that 
 < 0 = ~	2(0) < ,
which means that there exists a period-two cycle. 
When ftg1t=0 exhibits a period-two cycle, the sequence of capital stock
fztg1t=0 converges to a period-two cycles as well.10 This claim is proven as
10Even though a period-two cycle of ftg1t=0 exists, it might or might not be globally
stable. If the period-two cycle is globally stable, then for any initial value of 0, the
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follows. Without loss of generality, we can suppose that ftg1t=0 takes the
values as 2t = L and 2t+1 = H for t  0, where L < H . From Eq.(11),
we obtain the law of motion of capital stock for odd periods and for even
periods respectively as follows:































. Likewise, the capital stock in even












zo 6= ze and thus fztg1t=0 converges to a period-two cycle. Figure 2 demon-
strates the dynamic behavior of the sequence fztg1t=0. Since F (L) > F (H),
it holds that zo > ze. This claim for period-two cycles can be easily applied
to period-n cycles, although we omit the formal proof for this. That is to
say, if we suppose that fg1t=0 exhibits a period-n cycle, fztg1t=0 converges to
a period-n cycle as well.
[Figure 2 around here]
6 CHAOTIC BUSINESS CYCLES
To see under what degree of nancial development the economy experiences
endogenous business uctuations, we examine two extreme cases in which
 = 0 and in which  is very close to one. If  = 0, then it follows from
Eqs.(14) and (15) that  = 0 and  > 0. In this case, since the economy
is Samuelsonian, we note from proposition 1 that no cycles appear in equi-
librium. By continuity, there exits L 2 (0; 1) such that for  2 [0; L), no
sequence ftg1t=0 converges to it. If the period-two cycle is not globally stable, then the
economy exhibits the period-two cycle only when the initial value of 0 is equal to 0 in
the above proof by accident.
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cycles appear in equilibrium. If  is very close to one, then the rst term of
Eq.(13) degenerates. In this case, obviously no cycles appear, either. Again,
by continuity, there exists H 2 (0; 1) such that for  2 (H ; 1), no cycles ap-
pear. Therefore, it is when nancial sector development is at an intermediate
level that endogenous business cycles can appear in equilibrium.






(G()   ) <  2, the economy exhibits endogenous
cycles because the steady state with  =  is locally unstable.11 This in-
equality implies that if an economy is classical (i.e., G() < ) and if the
population density around  =  is very small (that is to say, g() is very
small), then the economy exhibits endogenous business cycles.
Intuitively, the appearance of endogenous business cycles is explained by
the demand for and supply of nancial resources. Let us suppose that the
economy is classical and  is an intermediate value. Suppose also that the







(G()  ) <  2 holds. At the beginning, the economy is assumed
to be in the trade steady state ( = ). If Bt goes up at the beginning of
time t for some reason, then t goes up as well. In this case, the nancial
intermediary can promise savers a higher interest rate than it was for two
reasons. The rst reason is that if t goes up, then the supply of capital goods
becomes small and thus the price of capital goods increases, which is followed
by the increase in rt+1. The second reason is that since t goes up, the number
of less talented agents who are engaged in production becomes smaller than
it was. Then, the productivity for creating capital goods increases and thus
rt+1 rises. If rt+1 rises so much, nancial resources at time t + 1 probably
increase even though Bt goes up (note that Bt is negative now.). Therefore,
Bt+1 decreases. If Bt+1 reduces, then t+1 goes down. When the population
density around  =  is very small, the reaction of t+1 to the slight change
of t is very big so as for Eq.(10) to hold. That is why endogenous business
cycles appear.
To investigate the dynamic property of the sequence ftg1t=0 more con-
cretely, we assume that  follows a uniform distribution U(0; 1) to the end.
Accordingly, the dierence equation associated with the dynamical system
11This claim holds even in the case in which the minimum of 	() is less than zero .
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(X;	) is given by:






We can verify that 	 : X ! X is a (upside-down) unimodal map. Let





. In order for 	 to map X into itself, 	(m) should be no less
than zero. So we continue to assume that the minimum of 	(t) is no less
than zero, i.e., 	(m)  0.
With a unimodal map, we can use Mitra's (2001) sucient condition for
the existence of topological chaos, which is a weaker sucient condition than
the Li-Yorke theorem (Li and Yorke, 1975).
Theorem 1
Suppose that 	(m)  0. If 	 satises 	2(m) > m and 	3(m) > , then
(X;	) exhibits topological chaos.
Proof : See Mitra (2001).
If an economy satises Mitra's condition, the dynamical system (X;	) has





3   1, and  = 1
2
, then the dynamical system exhibits topological
chaos, satisfying Mitra's sucient condition. The formal proof of this claim
is upon request. The phase diagram is given by gure 3.
[Figure 3 around here]
7 NUMERICAL ANALYSIS
In this section, we investigate to what type of cycles the economy converges
or under what value of  the economy exhibit complex dynamics by executing
numerical analyses. We keep assuming that   U(0; 1).
In the following numerical analyses, we allow the minimum of 	(t) to
be less than zero, i.e., 	(m) < 0. If 	(m) < 0, then for almost all the initial
12We consider an upside-down case, whereas Mitra gives a theorem for the usual uni-
modal case. Therefore, the inequalities in theorem 1 are the reverse of those of Mitra
(2001).
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values 0 2 X, the sequence, ftg1t=0, enters A0 = f 2 X : 	() < 0g (see
gure 4) and escapes from X in nite time. If a sequence ftg1t=0 escapes
from X in nite time, it cannot be an equilibrium. As studied by Boldrin, et
al. (2001) in detail, the remaining set of 0 2 X, with which the associated
sequence ftg1t=0 does not enter A0, is a Cantor set whose Lebesgue measure
is equal to zero. On the Cantor set, if the initial value of 0 2 X happens to
be consistent with the existence of equilibrium, then the sequence ftg1t=0 will
be equilibrium. For instance, if the sequence ftg1t=0 starts with a stationary
value of a period-two cycle as in gure 4, it becomes an equilibrium. If the
sequence ftg1t=0 starts with the steady state,  or , then it becomes an
equilibrium as well. Moreover, on the Cantor set, the equilibrium path would
even display complex dynamics and would exhibit sensitive dependence on
initial conditions.13 Since the measure of the Cantor set is zero, we will see
empty windows in bifurcation diagrams if 	(m) < 0 (see gure 5e below).
[Figure 4 around here]
To investigate if the economy has a \globally stable" cycle or not, we
analyze the dynamical system (X;	) numerically, observing bifurcation dia-
grams. We create the bifurcation diagrams for the dynamical system (X;	),
iterating 10000 times. We set the initial condition to 0 = 0:01. It is well








2 < 0 for all  2 X, then the orbits starting from almost all the
initial values of 0 2 X have the same asymptotic dynamic behavior. Since
our Schwarzian derivatives are negative for any value of  2 [0; 1), the choice
of initial conditions is not important.14
Figures 5a-5e give bifurcation diagrams with respect to the degree of
nancial development, i.e., . To pin down the value of  is dicult because
zt is considered to incorporate human capital as well as physical capital in
our model. We utilize the lower limit of the estimation for labor's share
of output by Mankiw, et al. (1992). According to them, the lower limit
13To the best of our knowledge, in the literature of economics, only Boldrin, et al. (2001)
deal with equilibria on Cantor sets. See also Devaney (1989).
14See Guckenheimer and Holmes (1983) for this point. It is very dicult to verify the
sign of our Schwarzian derivative analytically. We numerically conrmed that the signs are
negative by plotting the values of our Schwarzian derivatives. Furthermore, we examined
various initial values and found that the asymptotic behavior of the dynamical system is
invariant to the initial values.
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of 1    is estimated as 0:29. Hence, we pin down  = 0:71. For , we
examine various cases:  = 0:63; 0:64; 0:65; 0:66; 0:67.15 As predicted in the
previous section, for all the diagrams, if  is small or large, ftg1t=0 converges
to an asymptotically stable steady-state equilibrium. The economy does not
exhibit complex dynamics in these cases.
As seen in gure 5a, if  = 0:63, and if credit constraints are moderate, the
economy converges to a period-four cycle asymptotically. In gure 5b where
 = 0:64, as  increases from zero, the rst period doubling bifurcation occurs
around  = 0:313 and the second period doubling bifurcation occurs around
 = 0:419. These period doubling bifurcations are repeated over and over
again and, eventually, the economy enters a so-called \chaotic region". When
 decreases from one, the similar things happen. However, it is interesting
that from  = 0:535 to  = 0:543, complex dynamics does not appear and
that the economy converges to a period-six cycle. Likewise, for the case
in which  = 0:66 in gure 5d, while the moderate value of  gives chaotic
regions, the intermediate value of  gives a non-complex dynamics. However,
when  = 0:65 in gure 5c, there is no non-complex region sandwiched by
two complex regions. When  = 0:67 in gure 5d, we can observe an empty
window for the dynamics from  = 0:53 to  = 0:557. As discussed before,
this is because 	(m) < 0 holds in this region.
[Figure 5 around here]
8 CONCLUDING REMARKS
Financial development has serious eects on macroeconomic phenomena, es-
pecially on the dynamic properties of economies as studied in this paper.
Our ndings are as follows: (i) an economy with credit constraints converges
to an asymptotically stable steady state if the credit constraints are severe
or too soft and (ii) it is possible that deterministic cycles or chaos arise in
equilibrium if credit constraints are moderate. From these consequences, we
can safely say that it is when the degree of nancial development is moderate
that an economy is highly volatile. Because this is a testable claim, we can
check this prediction empirically.
15If we assume that the annual subjective discount rate is 0:92, then  = 0:63 corre-
sponds to 6:5 years and  = 0:67 to 8:5 years, which can be reasonably considered as the
intermediate-term loan contracts.
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The heterogeneous-agent model that we construct in this paper is tractable
and can be extended to various research areas such as international trade,
international nance, monetary economics, and so on. For example, by con-
structing similar models to ours, Kunieda (2008) studies eciency eects
of asset bubbles, and Kunieda and Shibata (2011) present an endogenous
growth model to derive growth cycles. Kunieda et al. (2014) develop a two-
country model to investigate the eect of capital liberalization on economic
growth when there are corrupt bureaucrats in the countries.
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Figure 5a. Bifurcation Diagram for phi, Gamma=0.63
Vertical axis: φt
Horizontal axis: μ.
Figure 5b. Bifurcation Diagram for phi, Gamma=0.64
Vertical axis: φt
Horizontal axis: μ
Figure 5c. Bifurcation Diagram for phi, Gamma=0.65
Vertical axis: φt
Horizontal axis: μ
Figure 5d. Bifurcation Diagram for phi, Gamma=0.66
Vertical axis: φt
Horizontal axis: μ
Figure 5e. Bifurcation Diagram for phi, Gamma=0.67
